



December 10, 2007

Ms. Sammie Cervantes
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VIA ELECTRONIC AND U.S. MAIL

Re: Comments on the Draft Supplemental EIS/EIR for Extending the Environmental Water Account and OCAP Consultations

Dear Ms. Cervantes:

We are writing on behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") and its more than 120,000 members in California with regard to the draft supplemental EIS/EIR ("DSEIS/EIR") for the Environmental Water Account ("EWA"). The DSEIS/EIR proposes to extend the existing EWA program, which is currently set to expire at the end of 2007, for another four years, through 2011. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the California Department of Water Resources, the co-lead agencies for the DSEIS/EIR, propose to take this action without providing any analysis of how the EWA has functioned since its inception in 2001 or whether the EWA has succeeded in achieving its stated fish protection purposes. In fact, the EWA has *not* functioned as envisioned and, by placing artificial restraints on the amount of water ostensibly available for fish protection, has contributed to the *decline* of imperiled fish in the Delta, most of which are in worse condition today than they were in 2001. For these reasons, we urge the agencies to discontinue the failed experiment of the EWA, and to devote the taxpayer resources currently dedicated to the EWA to actions that could provide a real benefit to imperiled fish.

In previous biological opinions on the joint operations of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project (i.e., the "Operating Criteria and Plan" or "OCAP"), the agencies have considered the EWA a central feature to mitigate the harmful impacts of the projects on listed fish. The Bureau has reinitiated consultation on those OCAP biological opinions, and those reconsultations are ongoing. Apparently, the agencies have not yet defined the "project" for this reconsultation and it is unclear whether the agencies are contemplating including the EWA in the new project description. Because the EWA has failed to function as a fish protective measure and should not be considered an effective mitigation or conservation tool in the new biological opinions, we seek consideration of these comments in those ongoing consultations as well. Likewise, we request that this information be incorporated, by DWR and DFG, into efforts to comply with the requirements of CESA.

I. THE EWA HAS NOT FUNCTIONED AS ENVISIONED

There is no doubt that in past years the water promised for fish protection through both the Environmental Water Account and the CVPIA (b)(2) account has been significantly less than what was promised in the CALFED ROD. *Finding the Water: New Water Supply Opportunities to Revive the San Francisco Bay-Delta*, Environmental Defense, 2005 (appended as Exhibit 1). From 2001-2004, the EWA provided only 29% on average of the expected 195,000 acre-feet of operational assets. *Id.* at 12-13. Collectively, the EWA and b(2) have contributed as much as 500,000 acre-feet *less* water per year towards fish protection and restoration than anticipated in the CALFED ROD. These shortfalls have occurred while exports from the Delta have reached record high levels and the ecosystem has continued spiraling downward. Clearly, the EWA experiment has not performed as planned.

The failure of the EWA to function as envisioned is epitomized in the failure of the agencies to invoke Tier 3 this year – the intended backstop for any shortfall in EWA assets. EWA Tier 3 was supposed to ensure that if EWA was underfunded or failed to perform as anticipated (both of which have happened), sufficient water would be provided to ensure no jeopardy to listed fish. As explained in the Tier 3 Protocol, a copy of which is appended hereto as Exhibit 2:

As part of the MSCS Conservation Agreement and the FWS and NMFS biological opinions, the CALFED agencies have provided a commitment, *subject to specified conditions and legal requirements*, that for the first four years of Stage 1, there will be no reductions, beyond existing regulatory levels, in CVP or SWP Delta exports resulting from measures to protect fish under FESA and CESA. *This commitment is based on the availability of three tiers of assets:*

...

Tier 3 is based upon the commitment and ability of the CALFED Agencies to make additional water available should it be needed.

...

Tier 3 is a fail-safe device, intended to be used only when Tier 1 and Tier 2 are insufficient to avoid jeopardy to the continued existence of an endangered or threatened species.

...

The State and Federal Projects will be responsible for making preparations for the activation of Tier 3.

(Emphasis added). This language makes clear that the assurances provided under CALFED, and the ESA and CESA compliance of the EWA, were dependent upon the existence and availability of these Tier 3 assets.

Unfortunately, when the time came to call upon this Tier 3 “fail-safe”, the agencies failed to trigger it, ensuring that listed species rather than water users would suffer the consequences of the failure of the EWA to live up to its stated purpose. There can be no question that Tier 1 and Tier 2 have been and are insufficient to avoid jeopardy to the threatened delta smelt. A federal court held in May of this year that the “delta smelt is indisputably in jeopardy as to its survival and recovery.” *NRDC v. Kempthorne*, Order on Summary Judgment at 119 (May 25, 2007). This finding echoes the findings of several expert fisheries biologists, including staff of many

state and federal agencies. *See, e.g.*, DSWG Briefing Statement (May 15, 2007) (“the species has become critically imperiled and an emergency response is warranted”) (attached hereto as Exhibit 3); Statement Presented by Ryan Broddrick, Director, CDFG, to House Subcommittee on Water and Power (July 2, 2007) (“it is DFG’s position that actions must be taken to protect as many individual smelt as can be through manipulation of the water projects. Each reproducing organism is important to the survival of the species.”) (appended hereto as Exhibit 4). Despite these findings and the continued take of large numbers of delta smelt at the Project pumps this past summer, *see* delta smelt May, June and July take tables (appended hereto as Exhibit 5), the Project agencies obstinately refused to invoke Tier 3.

Inexplicably, the DSEIS/EIR makes no mention of this breakdown of the EWA’s “fail-safe”, nor does it describe or analyze the historical shortfalls of the EWA or the program’s failure to function as envisioned. These shortcomings are far more relevant to the foreseeable impacts of extending the program than any of the purely hypothetical modeled impacts contained in the DSEIS/EIR. The DSEIS/EIR must be revised to address these issues. Further, these historical realities belie the statement in DSEIS/EIR that “[i]f pumping would be likely to put at risk the continued existence of a species listed as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Project Agencies would curtail pumping even if purchases already totaled 600,000 acre-feet and all assets were used.” DSEIS/EIR at ES-5. This is precisely the situation that presented itself to the Project Agencies this summer, and the agencies failed to curtail pumping once EWA assets were depleted even though continued pumping threatened the continued existence of the delta smelt.

Moreover, the DSEIS/EIR seeks to utilize the ESA/CESA process for coverage of the EWA initially established in the CALFED ROD, without addressing any of these fundamental failures of the process to operate as envisioned and which were essential to the CALFED analysis. *See generally* DSEIS/EIR Appendix C.¹ For example, Tier 3 no longer exists as a viable “fail-safe device.” Yet, the CALFED assurances were explicitly “based on the availability of three tiers of assets.” Tier 3 Protocol. The DSEIS/EIR makes passing reference to this change, obliquely noting that “[b]ased on current circumstances, these three tiers are no longer an accurate way to describe EWA assets.” DSEIS/EIR at 2-4. But the document fails to acknowledge the implications of omitting this critical “fail-safe device” or to describe the replacement structure of the EWA going forward.

In short, the DSEIS/EIR fails to adequately describe the project to decisionmakers and the public or to disclose the environmental impacts associated with the policy choice of extending the EWA. The document should be revised to correct these shortcomings. We believe that an accurate description and assessment of the EWA will demonstrate that the program should not be extended.

¹ The DSEIS/EIR also fails entirely to discuss the state court decision finding that DWR lacks the necessary CESA coverage for operation of the SWP, which also likely impacts the CESA analysis in Appendix C. It is unclear, for example, how EWA assets pumped through the SWP facilities at Clifton Court forebay and Banks pumping plant have CESA take authority when the court found that the SWP lacked any take authority for its pumping operations. The DSEIS/EIR must be revised to address this issue.

II. THE EWA HAS LIMITED, RATHER THAN EXPANDED, THE AMOUNT OF WATER AVAILABLE FOR IMPERILED FISH

Since shortly after the first EWA ROD was signed in 2004, the program has been used as an excuse by the agencies to deny needed water to imperiled fish rather than to help protect and recover imperiled fish. For example, in February 2005, when delta smelt populations were at then-record low levels, fishery biologists recommended that exports be curtailed to reduce entrainment. However, because EWA supplies were scarce, project managers did not curtail exports as much or as long as was requested. *Compare* “Data Assessment Team” call notes (Feb. 1, 2005) (recommending combined exports be reduced to 1500 cfs for one week) (appended hereto as Exhibit 6, without attachments) *with* CVO smelt report (February 2005) (showing much higher combined export levels) (appended as Exhibit 7). Hundreds of delta smelt were taken at the pumps as a result. *Id.* The lawful and proper course of action would have been for the agencies to fully implement the recommended action, and then use non-EWA project water to meet fish needs later in the year if EWA supplies ran short. Instead, the program has been implemented to turn this requirement on its head, and to short fish without any consideration given to imposing uncompensated reductions on project contractors and other water users.

Unfortunately, the agencies have continued this pattern of using limited EWA assets to deny needed fish protection actions. In 2006, as the delta smelt continued its unparalleled decline in abundance, the Delta Smelt Working Group (“DSWG”) evaluated a range of protective actions that could be taken to lessen the impacts of water project operations. One action that was evaluated was to address fall (September-December) Delta salinity levels by making releases from upstream reservoirs to increase Delta outflows. The discussions and analyses of this proposed action are reported in DSWG notes for July 10 (see also the notes from August 21, and Sept 26 (appended hereto as Exhibits 8). The DSWG determined that the fall action had a high likelihood of being successfully implemented and that the scientific basis for the action was supported by statistically significant correlations.

Ultimately, the fall action was not taken because it was determined that “the amounts of water needed to demonstrably improve fall habitat quantity/quality [were] unavailable”. Based on analyses provided by DWR, the amount of water necessary for maintaining net Delta outflows at 7000 cfs for the September-December period would range from only 170-433 TAF. DSWG notes (Aug. 21, 2006). As a result of not taking this action, Delta outflows steadily declined, falling below 6000 cfs in October, and salinity levels shifted upstream of 80 km, the critical threshold identified by the DSWG for delta smelt habitat quality and subsequent abundance. Delta smelt abundance plummeted to a new record low the following year, indicating that the fisheries agencies were not sufficiently addressing adverse habitat conditions in the Delta and other stressors to ensure the delta smelt’s survival and recovery.

Perceived unavailability of water assets was also the reason behind the DSWG rejecting a protective action in winter 2006 intended to set net flows in Old and Middle Rivers to zero cfs to better protect pre-spawning adults. Low San Joaquin River inflows and negative flows on Old and Middle Rivers, concurrent with high export rates, are likely creating hydrodynamic conditions that draw greater numbers of fish to the pumps and correspond to significantly higher

salvage rates. Protection of these biologically valuable spawning adult fish is essential for recovery and sustainability of this at-risk species. Despite the expected benefit of taking this action, it was rejected because “DWR staff have derived estimates of the water costs of the potential actions in the Resources Agency POD Action Matrix and found that the proposed winter action could consume all available environmental water, leaving no assets for spring actions for larvae or juveniles.” DSWG notes (Dec. 11, 2006) (appended as Exhibit 9); *see also* DSWG notes (Oct. 10, 2006) (“The Working Group notes that some of the weaknesses of the DFG plan included the potential to exhaust all EWA and B2 assets in winter, leaving nothing in reserve for spring actions”) (appended as Exhibit 10).

More recently, NMFS’ biologists testified against taking actions to protect delta smelt based on a similar misperception that the total amount of water available to protect imperiled salmonids was limited to a pot of “environmental water” defined by EWA and b(2) assets, and that water used to protect smelt would necessarily deplete the amount of water available to protect salmon. *See* Declaration of Bruce Oppenheim in *NRDC v. Kempthorne* ((June 15, 2007) (appended as Exhibit 11). For example, Mr. Oppenheim explained that “the use of environmental water after VAMP on the San Joaquin River may have consequences later in the year on the Sacramento River.” *Id.* at 3. This statement is only true if there is a limited pot of “environmental water” available to meet all fisheries needs – a position that is contrary to numerous requirements of state and federal law.

All of these decisions are based on the incorrect assumption that the amount of water available to protect listed fish species is limited to the assets of the EWA, CVPIA b(2), and other sources of water “dedicated” to the environment. The Bureau has perpetuated this fallacy, asserting that it must meet the needs of CVP contractors before meeting the needs of listed fish species. *See* Declaration of Ronald Milligan in *NRDC v. Kempthorne* (June 21, 2007) (“Reclamation operates New Melones to meet ... project needs of the East Side Division CVP contractors” which leaves “no additional water available for out of basin releases from New Melones Reservoir” even if needed to prevent jeopardy to listed delta smelt) (appended as Exhibit 12); *see also* Transcript of Hearing re Interim Remedies Day 7, *NRDC v. Kempthorne*, Testimony of Ronald Milligan at 1553-54 (Aug. 31, 2007) (explaining that the WOMT rejected some recommendations of the DSWG because of concerns regarding “the ability for the EWA to function in a manner that it could, in essence, pay back the projects for curtailments without impacting operations in the long term sense or allocations to contractors”) (appended as Exhibit 13). Similarly, DWR has asserted that it has no additional water available for fish protection, while simultaneously making hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of surplus “Article 21” and “turnback pool” water available to water users and contractors.

This presumed EWA limitation on the amount of water available to protect fish is simply not correct. Numerous courts have made it abundantly clear that the Bureau and DWR must provide sufficient water to protect and recover listed fish species, whether it exceeds the amount of the water the agencies may have earmarked for that purpose or not. *See, e.g., NRDC v. Kempthorne*, Order on Summary Judgment at 61 (May 25, 2007) (“The EWA is simply a means by which the SWP and CVP can obtain water by purchasing it from willing sellers. ... If money is unavailable to fund the EWA, Defendants are nonetheless required to prevent smelt take from exceeding permissible take limits. ... [I]f all else fails, [additional] assets may be brought to bear, which

include ‘additional purchased or operational assets, funding to secure additional assets if needed, or project water if funding or assets are unavailable.’”) (emphasis in original).

The agencies have turned the EWA on its head and, instead of using it to supplement the resources needed *and required* for fish protection, have used it as an excuse to short the environment and avoid committing those mandatory resources. Unless the agencies make very clear that limited EWA assets cannot be used as a reason not to take an action that would help protect or restore imperiled fish, it should be discontinued.

III. THE ANALYSIS FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EWA HELPS PROTECT AT-RISK FISH SPECIES AND CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR RECOVERY

In addition to the problems discussed above, the DSEIS/EIR fails to provide adequate support for its conclusion that extending the EWA would benefit fish protection and restoration.

First, the document recognizes in several places that a pumping “window” during which EWA assets may be pumped out of the Delta without increasing adverse impacts to listed fish no longer exists. The document explains that “[t]he EWA protects fish at the pumps by reducing pumping when it would help at-risk fish species, then transferring EWA assets across the Delta at other times to repay CVP and SWP users for water lost during pump reductions.” DSEIS/EIR at 2-15. The DSEIS/EIR asserts that EWA assets should be used to reduce export pumping to protect fish from the months of December through July. DSEIS/EIR at 2-10 to 2-11. This proposal allows exports to increase to allow delivery of EWA water during the months of August through November. But several imperiled species are vulnerable to take at the pumps during this late summer/fall period. *See id.* at 2-13, 4-15. Moreover, the document notes that the alarming and continuing decline in four pelagic organisms in the Delta have corresponded to a period of “increased exports during June through December.” DSEIS/EIR at 4-11. In addition, recent studies have indicated that decreased Delta inflows in late fall and winter may result in reductions in fall habitat quality and eastward movement of X2, which may result in adverse impacts to fish. DSEIS/EIR at 4-13. Thus, it is unclear when a safe pumping window exists for EWA to increase Delta exports. Instead, it is likely that an extended EWA would simply help sustain the current record high levels of exports pumped out of the Delta – export levels that have corresponded to many of the declining fish populations in the Delta. *See, e.g., id.* at B-3 to B-4 (Banks pumping would increase in July, August, and September to convey EWA assets).

Second, the DSEIS/EIR assumes with no support that “[w]hile the fish actions in ... revised biological opinions [that are currently being developed for project operations] are unknown, they would likely be less than with the EWA program.” DSEIS/EIR at ES-4. This statement reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of ESA and CESA requirements, which *mandate* that project operations cause no jeopardy to the existence *or recovery* of listed species, cause no adverse modification of critical habitat for survival *or recovery* of listed species, and that the impacts of project take be minimized and fully mitigated. In addition, Section 7 also imposes an affirmative obligation on federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed” under the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). A program of “conservation” is one that brings the species to the point of recovery and delisting. *Id.* § 1532(3). In short, the

project agencies are obligated to protect, recover and conserve listed species, whether or not the EWA is in place.

Third, the DSEIS/EIR explicitly bases its analysis of fish actions on the invalidated, reinitiated, and discredited OCAP biological opinions, claiming that it “would be speculative to assume that the fish actions in the BO will be the same as those described by Judge Wanger because the BO will be based on a comprehensive review of all available information and science.” DSEIS/EIR at 1-6. In reality, Judge Wanger’s decision is based on a more comprehensive and current review of the science regarding the delta smelt than the invalidated BO, which failed even to acknowledge the precipitous decline of the delta smelt in recent years. In addition, the OCAP BO on listed salmonids has been discredited by more than three independent science reviews, including a CALFED review panel, which concluded that the BO was not based on the best available science. The DSEIS/EIR’s reliance on the fish actions encompassed in these discredited BOs for the basis of its analysis lacks a reasonable basis.

Fourth, the Bureau has reinitiated consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service on the OCAP. That consultation is ongoing. Until the Bureau meets the requirements of ESA §7 and, among other things, obtains a valid biological opinion at the conclusion of consultation, the ESA § 7(d) prohibition on making any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources applies to the Bureau’s actions. Regional Director Kirk Rodgers has correctly recognized that reauthorization of the EWA during the pendency of the OCAP consultations would be a violation of §7(d), and has (twice) sworn to a federal court that such authorization would not occur before completion of the new BOs. *See* Declaration of Kirk Rodgers (Oct. 18, 2006), Declaration of Kirk Rodgers (July 9, 2007) (appended hereto as Exhibit 14). Reauthorization of the EWA as proposed in the DSEIS/EIR runs afoul of the 7(d) prohibition and contradicts Mr. Rodgers sworn statements in the pending OCAP lawsuits.

Finally, the DSEIS/EIR concludes that continuation of the EWA “would have a less than significant impact on X2 location during June through December.” DSEIS/EIR at ES-9. However, as the document recognizes, emerging science indicates that moving X2 westward of its recent historic location in the fall could have a significant beneficial impact on listed species and their habitat. By reducing outflow in the fall, EWA could have a significantly detrimental impact on the ability of agencies to meet this new threshold.

IV. THE ANALYSIS FAILS TO EVALUATE THE EWA’S FAILURE TO ASSIST IN ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION BEYOND ESA/CESA COMPLIANCE

To date, as discussed above, the EWA has primarily, even exclusively, been operated to limit protective ESA/CESA actions. However, the failure of the EWA extends even farther. The EWA was intended to “provide water for the protection and recovery of fish.” CALFED Programmatic ROD at 54. Note that these benefits are not restricted to listed species. The ROD also states that the EWA will “acquire water for ecosystem and species recovery needs.” CALFED ROD NCCP Determination at 21. Thus, the EWA was intended as a tool to provide restoration benefits beyond the requirements of ESA/CESA for listed species. These benefits were an important part of the Ecosystem Restoration Program and were the justification for

public funding for the EWA. The document does not analyze the failure of the EWA to provide these anticipated benefits.

Indeed, far from facilitating improved ecosystem health, by limiting ESA/CESA actions and by increasing diversions during the August to November period, the EWA has damaged ecosystem health. This failure is indicated by the fact that non-listed species, such as threadfin shad, are showing the same decline affecting listed species such as the delta smelt and that the Pelagic Organism Decline process has identified “water project operations” as a potential cause of the decline of Delta fishes. *See* Interagency Ecological Program 2006-2007 Work Plan to Evaluate the Decline of Pelagic Species in the Upper San Francisco Estuary (January 12, 2007) at 4 (appended hereto as Exhibit 15). The document does include one, inadequate mention of these impacts, by concluding that “(t)he entrainment indices for threadfin shad and American shad would be increase.” DEIS/EIR at 4-36. Clearly, the EWA has undermined, rather than facilitated, the CALFED ecosystem restoration goal.

The document must be revised to fully and adequately evaluate the failure of the EWA to contribute to fisheries and ecosystem restoration beyond the requirements of ESA/CESA.

V. THE ANALYSIS FAILS TO EVALUATE THE EWA’S FUTURE USEFULNESS TO FACILITATE “REAL TIME” MANAGEMENT

The EWA was also intended to provide “real time diversion management” of Delta flows and the CVP and SWP Delta pumps. CALFED ROD NCCP Determination at 29. Such real time management assumes that the EWA has enough flexibility to modify Delta flows and the management of the projects beyond the relatively fixed prescriptive requirements of ESA/CESA compliance. The document fails to analyze the extent to which the EWA will provide such flexibility to achieve additional ecosystem or protective measures. Unless the management priorities or assets of the EWA are changed dramatically (a change that this document does not anticipate) it appears unlikely that the EWA will have much, if any, flexibility to provide additional protective measures. To the contrary, to the extent that the EWA provides real time management, this flexibility is designed to increase pumping, potentially causing additional impacts to the ecosystem, and designed solely to provide additional water supplies for South of Delta CVP and SWP contractors.

VI. THE FAILURE TO ANALYZE PAST PERFORMANCE UNDERMINES A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE EWA -- TO FACILITATE ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

The CALFED ROD was designed with science-based adaptive management as a “central feature.” CALFED Programmatic ROD at 4. This document repeats this assertion that “(a)daptive management is a key component of the EWA,” and that “(a)daptive management provides a process to change fish actions or asset acquisitions.” DSEIS/EIR at page 2-24. The careful evaluation of the past performance of management tools is the defining feature of adaptive management, in order to allow improved, adaptive future management. Indeed, the ROD explicitly commits CALFED agencies to “assess the success of EWA operations.” CALFED ROD EWA Operating Principles Agreement at 4. Without such analysis, agencies

cannot “adapt” the management of the program in a manner that builds on past successes and responds to failures. The analysis of past performance of the EWA as an adaptive management tool is critical to the central purpose of this document – extending the EWA into the future. Such analysis is also important to agencies, such as the Delta Vision Task Force, the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan process, the Department of Fish and Game, NOAA Fisheries and the Fish and Wildlife Service, which may consider the merits of incorporating the EWA into future management for the Delta. Finally, such analysis is essential to the legislature and the Administration as they consider the justification for public funding for the EWA. An analysis of the past performance of the EWA will reveal that there is no justification for such continued public funding. As discussed above, the document fails to analyze past performance, a failure that cuts to the core of the purpose of the EWA as an adaptive management tool. The document must be revised to fully and accurately analyze the effectiveness of the EWA as an adaptive management tool.


VII. THE DOCUMENT FAILS TO DESCRIBE ACCURATELY THE PROJECT PURPOSE

As discussed above, the document does not adequately analyze the EWA’s failure to engage in real time management and adaptive management, to ensure ESA/CESA compliance and to contribute to broader ecosystem restoration. The document also does not include any meaningful provisions to address these failures. The document, however, largely maintains the old, inaccurate description of the purpose of the EWA. DSEIS/EIR at page 2-3. Thus, the document fails to adequately describe the purpose of the project. At the moment, the actual purpose of the EWA appears to be to limit protective actions under ESA and CESA, and to provide additional water supplies to south of Delta water contractors. The document should be revised to include an accurate description of the project.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In light of these many shortcomings in the operation of the EWA and the analysis of the DSEIS/EIR, we urge you to reject the proposal to extend the program beyond the end of 2007. In the alternative, we urge you to withdraw this document and issue a new, adequate draft that addresses the concerns outlined above.

Sincerely,



Katherine S. Poole
Senior Attorney



Barry Nelson
Senior Policy Analyst

Cc: Cay Goude, USFWS
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